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Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and 
Proprietary Software 
Jonathan Zittrain† 
The production of most mass-market software can be grouped roughly according to free and pro-
prietary development models. These models differ greatly from one another, and their associated li-
censes tend to insist that new software inherit the characteristics of older software from which it may be 
derived.  Thus the success of one model or another can become self-perpetuating, as older free software 
is incorporated into later free software and proprietary software is embedded within successive proprie-
tary versions. The competition between the two models is fierce, and the battle between them is no 
longer simply confined to the market. Claims of improper use of proprietary code within the free 
GNU/Linux operating system have resulted in multi-billion dollar litigation.  This article explains the 
ways in which free and proprietary software are at odds, and offers a framework by which to assess 
their value—a prerequisite to determining the extent to which the legal system should take more than a 
passing, mechanical interest in the doctrinal claims now being pressed against GNU/Linux specifically 
and free software generally. 
INTRODUCTION 
For the past twenty years, the modern landscape of information tech-
nology has accommodated competing spheres of software production. 
These spheres can be grouped roughly around two poles warring for domi-
nance in the field. On one side is proprietary software, which typically pro-
vides cash-and-carry functionality for the end-user. Its source code “recipe” 
is nearly always hidden from view as a technical matter, and as a legal mat-
ter it cannot be used by independent programmers to develop new software 
without the rarely-given permission of its unitary rights holder. On the other 
side is “free” software, the recipes of which are open to public view and 
use. Some free software is further “copylefted,” that is, copyrighted for the 
purpose of incorporating license restrictions designed to ensure that anyone 
who uses and releases the copylefted code as a component of new software 
must also release that new software under copyleft’s otherwise-permissive 
terms.
1 
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The legal forms of proprietary and free software production cannot co-
exist within a given piece of code. The proprietary form relies on the exis-
tence and enforcement of prevailing copyright law. In contrast, copylefted 
code asserts a thus far legally untested license pegged to copyright in order 
to establish the restriction that successor code must be licensed in precisely 
the same way, namely with its source code freely available. The incom-
mensurability of free and proprietary legal structures within a single piece 
of software is but one facet of a fundamental philosophical divide between 
the structures’ respective hard-core adherents. Many who promote 
copylefted software do so only as a second best to the politically unattain-
able eradication of nearly all existing available proprietary rights in soft-
ware. Sellers of proprietary software, on the other hand, believe that the 
growing popularity of copylefted software threatens both their individual 
business models and the PC software industry generally—possibly leading 
to an equilibrium in which later innovation is largely forestalled, since no 
one can readily monopolize derivatives to popular free software to recoup 
large investments in improving the original works.  
The clash between models is currently unfolding most vividly among 
developers of microcomputer operating systems. This is because there are 
wildly popular operating systems generated by both models, some of which 
are functionally quite similar (such as the free GNU/Linux on the one hand 
and various proprietary Unixes on the other), others of which are largely in-
compatible and require path-dependent commitments by consumers to one 
or the other (such as the GNU/Linux on the one hand and the Microsoft 
Windows family on the other). Such intense competition provides extra in-
centives for one side to advance or fund claims of legal impropriety against 
the other, and the stakes in competition over operating system adoption are 
particularly high: horizontal network effects mean that widely adopted op-
erating systems can snowball into even further adoption, and successful op-
erating system makers can seek advantages in the marketing and sale of 
vertically related applications or hardware tied to their operating systems. 
The ongoing case of SCO Group v International Business Machines 
Inc
2 represents a major legal battle between the spheres of free and proprie-
tary software, at a moment when dominance over operating systems for 
Internet server-related purposes is truly up for grabs. Through a rather com-
plex chain of title, SCO has become the repository of a number of exclusive 
intellectual property rights surrounding the original Unix operating system 
initiated in 1969 at Bell Labs. The GNU/Linux operating system was self-
consciously developed by others beginning in 1984 to be functionally simi-
lar to Unix but completely nonproprietary; it was written with “fresh” code, 
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so that none of its source code recipe could be said to be copied or inherited 
from Unix. In the late 1990s a number of firms saw strategic benefit to 
making contributions to the GNU/Linux code base, even though the under-
standing was that such contributions could not be proprietized by the con-
tributing firms. The case began when SCO claimed that IBM had impermis-
sibly contributed code to GNU/Linux that in fact did come from Unix (spe-
cifically, IBM’s own licensed proprietary variant of Unix called AIX), thus 
violating IBM’s agreement with SCO and “poisoning” GNU/Linux in ways 
that implicate state unfair competition and trade secret law. SCO has an-
nounced it will be adding claims of copyright infringement as well.
3 SCO is 
seeking billions of dollars in damages from IBM and has terminated IBM’s 
license to sell AIX (which IBM claims SCO cannot do). Exactly what code 
is alleged to have been stolen has not yet been made public, and in the 
meantime SCO has asked, under general threat of litigation, that every en-
tity making use of GNU/Linux pay hundreds of dollars in licensing fees to 
SCO, the terms of which pretermit modifications or redistribution of 
GNU/Linux source code.
4To the extent they are heeded, SCO’s demands 
would result in the conversion of the flagship example of free, copylefted 
software into a proprietary system owned and controlled by SCO, one user 
at a time. 
The facts of SCO v IBM—many of which inhere in the intricacies of 
decades-old licensing agreements and the similarities between particular 
lines of code—will be developed over a trial process that could take years. I 
am concerned less with the facts underlying a doctrinal claim by SCO 
against IBM than I am with the implications of the case for the overall con-
flict between free and proprietary software. This is because the open devel-
opment model for free software invites continuing litigation over intellec-
tual property rights. Such litigation could be initiated by any number of 
firms that can plausibly claim infringement, for reasons that may include a 
larger strategic targeting of the free software development model. To prop-
erly assess and remedy these claims, the legal system must have a frame-
work with which to judge the social value of free software’s open develop-
ment model—and thereby decide how to apply ambiguous doctrine when 
claims of infringement arise, including claims that purport to reach not just 
developers but also consumers of that software. This is especially so be-
cause nonproprietary software doesn’t simply encompass discrete code 
bases like that of GNU/Linux: the fundamental protocols of the Internet and 
its subset World Wide Web are themselves nonproprietary and potentially 
vulnerable to claims of intellectual property ownership by any number of 
parties. 
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In order to normatively evaluate the spheres of free and proprietary 
software, it is helpful to briefly review their defining characteristics. This 
becomes especially important due to the still-ongoing semantic debates 
among software developers about what counts as “free” and “proprietary.”
5 
In reality, however, these debates often stand in for differing ideological 
preferences about how software should be written or shared. 
I.  DEFINING FREE AND PROPRIETARY SOFTWARE 
ALONG THREE DIMENSIONS 
A.  Legal Differences between Free and Proprietary Software 
In 1984 Richard Stallman quit his job at the MIT artificial intelligence 
lab to develop what he called “free” software—software that others could 
copy and change as they pleased. He found this type of sharing ethically 
important and endeavored to rewrite the proprietary Unix operating system 
from scratch so that his version would be substitutable for Unix without in-
fringing any copyrights in the existing Unix code. He named his project 
GNU, for “GNU’s Not Unix.” GNU culminated in 1992 after the contribu-
tion of a small but crucial piece of code captained by computer science stu-
dent Linus Torvalds. Torvalds’s addition of the “Linux kernel” made GNU 
(now called GNU/Linux, or, confusingly, just Linux) complete.
6 
Stallman’s own vision of free software evolved from that of software 
released without authorial restrictions on copying or derivation—a notion 
that could be accomplished by simply releasing one’s work into the public 
domain—into software governed by a licensing scheme that would prohibit 
authors of derivations from placing restrictions on the distribution of their 
derived works that had not been placed on the distribution of the original 
code. Preventing the “proprietization” of derivative software lies at the 
heart of Stallman’s “copyleft” General Public License (GPL), under which 
GNU/Linux and a great deal of other free software are now distributed.
7 
Copyleft was styled as a form of legal jujitsu—a use of copyright (and the 
availability of accompanying licensing terms) to “protect” free software 
from being more restrictively copyrighted by those who added their own 
code to the existing software and redistributed the end product. Indeed, 
copyleft’s restrictions may kick in even before a later work incorporates 
sufficient code from a copylefted program to be considered a derivative 
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work; Stallman’s license is written to cover any work “that in whole or in 
part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof.”
8 
Stallman’s flagship GPL has been joined by a flotilla of other similar 
licenses by other authors, all with their own variations. Beyond the univer-
sal trait of allowing others to build upon the base code and release the re-
sult, some, such as the license for a variant of Unix called BSD, allow oth-
ers to build upon the underlying software without passing on the accompa-
nying “copyleft” restrictions. The BSD license materially differs from a 
wholly public domain release only in that it requires a particular kind of 
credit or attribution for the original author on whose work the new program 
is based. Such works are usually called “open” rather than “free,” or if 
“free” are qualified as “but not copyleft.”
9 Other licenses allow new deriva-
tive works only under some form of copyleft restriction, but vary on 
whether “nearby works” (that is, works bundled on the same CD-ROM or 
linked to but not literally incorporated into the licensed code) must them-
selves be copylefted. 
Proprietary software in mass distribution almost uniformly reserves all 
rights to the author except a license to “run” the software on the purchaser’s 
computer.
10 For many users this restriction does not bar desired activity; 
non-programmers will evaluate a software purchase on the basis of the pro-
gram’s functionality rather than on its use as a base in producing other 
software. The most popular software includes tools that allow a user to ad-
just how the software operates in fine detail. Far beyond checking a box in 
a “Preferences” window, powerful “macro” languages are often built in to 
allow skilled users to alter the way in which their proprietary software op-
erates, essentially writing software that is run by their own software. There 
has been no suggestion that macros written by users cannot themselves be 
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transferred, copied, or licensed however the users desire, without claim of 
right by the proprietary software maker. (The absence of any claim to users’ 
macros may be more a market decision than a presumption that such a 
claim would not be sustained.) 
For proprietary software not in the mass market, any number of ar-
rangements might be agreed upon between the vendor and the consumer. 
The user might be permitted, for example, to see the source code and make 
changes, but not to distribute those changes to others. (Without such per-
mission, consumer changes, if substantial enough, would comprise deriva-
tive works—the creation of which is a right reserved to the original au-
thor.)
11 Most recently, in an apparent response to the successes of the free 
software movement, certain proprietary software makers have attempted to 
allow approved users some measure of ability to adapt proprietary software 
to their own uses by accessing and altering the software’s source code. Mi-
crosoft’s “Shared Source Initiative” (SSI) is one such example.
12 Through it, 
certain users can adapt Microsoft code to their own special needs, so long 
as they promise not to further share or sell that code to others. It is too early 
in the deployment of SSI to gauge how central it is to Microsoft’s software 
marketing efforts. While the company has not released systematic data on 
its adoption, Microsoft’s manager of the SSI reports that over 650,000 de-
velopers are using shared source code from the company.
13  
B.  Technical Differences between Free and Proprietary Software 
As suggested by the use of the term “recipe” for the code underlying 
functioning software, a given piece of software typically exists in two re-
lated components: source code and object code. Source code is what pro-
grammers write; object code is what computers run. Software developers 
produce object code from source code through the use of a compiler. Object 
code without source code is useful for running a program, but not for easily 
learning how it works or was written. An attempt to “decompile” object 
code back into source code yields instructions that bear little resemblance to 
the original recipe for the program, even if they are functionally equivalent. 
To analogize, imagine a “decompiled” recipe that calls for adding ¾ tea-
spoon of sugar, mixing, and then removing ¼ teaspoon of sugar. This is 
perhaps functionally equivalent to the original recipe that calls for adding ½ 
teaspoon of sugar, but would be a much more frustrating, though to be sure 
not impossible, task. 
Free software—at least as defined by Richard Stallman—is not free if 
the source code is not also included with the object code. Stallman has fa-
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mously stated that the “free” in “free software” is more like free speech 
than free beer.
14 One can charge for a particular copy of free software so 
long as the source is provided and a specific bundle of rights is delivered 
with the software—such as the right to further copy it.
15 On the other hand, 
one can give away proprietary software, like the Internet Explorer Web 
browser, without charge, and it still isn’t “free.” The GPL requires that any 
release of a covered program (for example, one whose author drew upon 
someone else’s GPL’d code to write it) must also readily make available the 
program’s corresponding source code. 
Releasing the object code without the source code has been a hallmark 
of proprietary software, complementing the creator’s exercise of a legal 
right to prevent the use of source code in new works with a technical barrier 
to unauthorized use. Still, these legal and technical facts are analytically in-
dependent of one another. Some proprietary programming code happens not 
to be compiled, so the “executable” and source are one and the same thing. 
For example, the code by which Web pages are rendered is typically this 
way; anyone viewing a Web page can, in most browsers, ask to “view 
source” and will promptly be shown the code by which the page came 
about. To copy such code and use it for purposes other than viewing the 
Web page in question might well infringe the copyright of the code’s author. 
Apart from the more typical instances in which the technical nature of cod-
ing permits object code to be given to users without easily revealing to 
them its ancestral source, phenomena like Microsoft’s SSI illustrate that 
vendors might willingly forgo the technical protections of releasing object 
code without source code, while still asserting strong legal protection over 
the uses of that released source code.
16 
Conversely, one might imagine a software author releasing, for what-
ever reason, only object code into the public domain. Such a release would 
leave no legal rights vested in the author, but the author might still be in an 
advantageous position to further exploit the software in new works, since 
only the author would have access to the clean source code for the program. 
Thus, the legal and technical protections afforded respectively by 
copyright in a program and the selective release of its object but not source 
code are by no means coextensive. In the technical realm, one can only 
make the general observation that there currently exists a spectrum—from 
public domain, through free, on to shared and then “fully” proprietary—and 
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that along that spectrum one tends to see increasing legal and technical re-
strictions on code’s use. 
C.  Developmental Differences between Free and Proprietary Software 
A third analytically independent difference along the spectrum from 
free to proprietary is the manner in which the software is typically devel-
oped. As most famously chronicled in Eric Raymond’s essay The Cathedral 
and the Bazaar,
17 at least two prevailing models of software development 
exist, roughly grouped around notions of free and proprietary software. The 
former “open” mode of development grows out of venerable academic 
computer science and amateur tinkering circles (amateur not in the sense of 
dilettante, but rather in the sense of one who undertakes something more 
out of love or fascination than professional duty). Open development em-
phasizes collaborative work even among strangers and across or even en-
tirely outside of the boundaries of firms, with users of a piece of software 
themselves contributing changes and improvements to the larger project 
over time. These improvements are often not made in response to others’ 
requests, but rather in order to make the software more usable to the person 
making the changes. The perceived absence of legal or technical constraints 
on the use and modification of a program’s code can, under the right cir-
cumstances, spawn hundreds of variants among myriad developers. For ex-
ample, the operating system Unix counts dozens of variants in its line, some 
licensed from an upstream claimant to proprietary rights.
18 Some versions 
of Unix available in source code to the tinkering public (such as FreeBSD 
and the self-consciously intended-as-free GNU/Linux) have been thought 
by those working on them to be free of practically all legal restrictions.  
The tremors of the SCO v IBM lawsuit—in which a single company 
has claimed rights to pieces of Unix that are claimed to have been incorpo-
rated into GNU/Linux—are significant precisely because they undermine 
the collaborative development model. Verifying the “legality” of code of-
fered by a contributor to a project is both superfluous to its technical 
merit—and thus possibly only of peripheral interest to project leaders—and 
nearly impossible to do with any thoroughness, since the proprietary code 
that is, by hypothesis, the source of pilfered free code is not accessible to 
project leaders assembling the free code from willing sources purporting to 
have the right to offer it. Any doubt as to the legal character of the result of 
the collaborative development process, if taken seriously, could impel soft-
ware developers to work only on code that they themselves originated, or 
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for which ownership interests are as clear as possible, with clarity achieved 
through certification procedures among contributors that circumscribe the 
number of participants and the pace of their contributions. 
The typical mode of development for proprietary software, by contrast, 
revolves around a firm and those software developers or other firms in spe-
cific privity to it. Software is conceived of, written, and tested in-house, and 
the firm takes some responsibility for user support and upgrades, all typi-
cally in response to market pressures and influences. More important for le-
gal purposes, a proprietary firm can stand behind the pedigree of its code, 
both because it presumably originated in controlled and known circum-
stances and because the absence of accompanying source code makes the 
firm’s offerings difficult to examine for evidence of theft, whether from 
competing proprietary companies or from copylefted, publicly available 
software. 
II.  NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES FOR THE EVALUATION OF SOFTWARE 
PRODUCTION MODELS 
The proprietary model of software development joins commoditized 
creative counterparts, such as literature, movies, and television, in relying 
heavily on government-created rights for its business model. This impli-
cates the much-explored question of just what the nature and scope of IP 
rights in software should be, and the newer, less-explored question of how 
those rights should play out when in conflict with free software.
19 The latter 
question arises when assessing the extent to which free software’s copyleft 
licenses should be enforced (something no court has ever squarely ruled 
on), or, more generally, in choosing sides in cases of “code poisoning,” 
when, as in SCO v IBM, the code from one model of development is said to 
have routinely tainted the code of another. 
To create a framework in which one might evaluate lawsuits such as 
SCO v IBM, I will explore several normative goals and see how each mode 
of software development fares with respect to each one. I conclude there is 
no one-size-fits-all model; for this and other reasons, the legal system 
should be chary of resolving ambiguous doctrinal issues in SCO v IBM and 
other potential suits too strongly or mechanically in favor of the proprietary 
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model, which for reasons I will explain is more consistently likely to be 
represented by the plaintiff in such suits. 
A.  Nonutilitarian Objectives/Moral Rights  
The justifications for free software generally (and copyleft specifi-
cally) invoked by its originator, Richard Stallman, are based on free soft-
ware as a social movement. This movement centers on the belief that soft-
ware (and all nonrivalrous goods) simply ought to be free as an ethical mat-
ter and that making it so as a matter of policy would not cause software de-
velopment to grind to a halt.
20 Stallman’s view no doubt discounts the mer-
cenary nature of many software coders, but in any case simply asserts the 
unfairness of only some members of society possessing a benefit—however 
it originated—that cannot legally be shared, even though there are no logis-
tical or technical barriers to its immediate enjoyment by all. This belief not 
only applies to access to executable code, but also access to source code, so 
that others may learn from it and improve upon it. 
So long as government policy is willing to permit proprietary claims to 
one’s work (or to one’s creative improvement upon public domain works), 
Stallman believes in a moral right to assert a proprietary claim against the 
proprietization by others of one’s own work. Stallman is thus among those 
who justify intellectual property rights—if at all—not for instrumentalist 
reasons, but rather due to the belief that one ought to be able to control 
one’s own intellectual fruits because it’s simply right to be able to do so. 
For example, Bruce Springsteen objected to Bob Dole playing “Born in the 
U.S.A.” at campaign rallies, though he found sending a widely reported fax 
to the campaign to be all the redress he wanted.
21 The same moral beliefs 
that can underlie a desire not to have one’s creative work enjoyed without 
payment or permission – that is, a stance that authors deserve the right to 
proprietize their works – are the very ones that can bolster Stallman’s claim 
that copyleft is appropriate, regardless of its instrumental effects on innova-
tion or other values, because it effectuates the wishes of the software’s crea-
tor. 
Stallman’s outlook contrasts with that of Eric Raymond and his Open 
Source Initiative,
22 a non-profit marketing effort for free software begun in 
the wake of Netscape’s announcement that its browser would be de-
                                                                                                                           
20  See Richard M. Stallman, Why Software Should Be Free, in Joshua Gay, ed, Free Software, 
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proprietized.
23 Raymond eschews moral argument in favor of espousing 
pragmatic advantages to individual firms that adopt nonproprietary soft-
ware.
24 The division between Stallman’s “free software” movement and 
Eric Raymond’s “open source” movement reflects in large measure a dif-
ference in normative outlook—Stallman’s deontological, Raymond’s con-
sequentialist. Stallman focuses on the innate responsibilities of software au-
thors to share their work with others (even if they charge per physical copy 
of the work); Raymond focuses on the benefits that accrue to authors and 
users if they avail themselves of a collaborative development model and a 
sharing of source code.  
If authorial control is the end, then copylefted software and proprietary 
software can be reconciled – they merely reflect different desires by au-
thors, each exercising control over respective works. The legal framework 
could recognize strong proprietary rights, to include the enforcement of 
copyleft licenses where authors elected to use them. If sharing existing 
works is the goal (rather than a means to a more general maximization of 
social welfare that would take other factors into account), then proprietary 
rights should be minimized and copyleft is unnecessary, since there is then 
no potential proprietization of one’s work to forestall through “jujitsu” li-
censing. 
In instances where one kind of code finds its way into another kind of 
code – what I have referred to as “code poisoning” – valuing an author’s 
control over his or her output would at its limit presumably overcome the 
author’s freedom to select from among other authors’ work as inputs. Of 
course, this still does not speak to remedy; one could value strong authorial 
control without, say, believing in statutory (rather than actual) damages for 
code poisoning. Indeed, one could imagine a legal framework that provided 
opportunity to correct poisoned code before damages of any kind accrued. 
B.  Utilitarian Objectives 
1.  Innovation. 
The proprietary model of software production yields activity encour-
aged by the availability of exclusive rights, while the existence of public 
domain and free software products shows that those rights are not always 
needed to encourage creative output. 
What impact would the absence of enforceable exclusive rights have 
on the innovation currently taking place in the proprietary market? Innova-
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tion would decline to the extent that software authors desire money and are 
relying upon exclusivity to generate income. In the absence of legal support 
for exclusivity, mercenarily-minded authors might shift more reliance to 
anti-copying controls and other technical measures to enforce exclusivity. 
For example, the provision of software could evolve into a service rather 
than a product: only by “tuning in” to the software author’s Internet portal 
could one run the author’s software, and access to this portal could be man-
aged through subscription instead of purchase. A “streaming software” site 
could then choose to market a lifetime subscription, which would in most 
respects be functionally equivalent to a purchase. This evolution appears to 
be taking place in the music industry, where physical instantiations such as 
cassettes and CDs are giving way to “soft” manifestations such as files lo-
cated on generic devices or on-demand streaming. From the consumer’s 
point of view, so long as there is ready Internet access, a shift from product 
to service as a way of technologically proprietizing legally unprotected 
software could make little difference. 
The true value of the exclusive rights to the software publishers may 
thus lie less in restricting users’ behavior, which can be effected through 
technical means such as copy protection or streaming, and more in restrict-
ing the behavior of competing vendors. The separation of source and object 
code offers a measure of technical protection, ensuring that outside com-
petitors have to go to some expense to reverse engineer targeted software. 
However, the migration of software engineers—and the source code they 
have written—from one firm to the next may force companies to fall back 
on unwieldy non-disclosure agreements or trade secret protection to pre-
serve exclusivity in the absence of copyright. Alternatively, firms could in-
crease the level of compartmentalization to which employees are subjected, 
giving them less access to company data so that they cannot easily take 
copies of the firm’s goods with them should they go or be lured away. A 
lessening of available proprietary rights could also stall the nascent sharing 
of source code by proprietary vendors—a practice still so limited, to be 
sure, that its loss would be virtually unnoticeable to the market at large. 
Still, none of these reactions is socially desirable; all would merely contrib-
ute to an arms race of protection and circumvention that legal protections in 
their ideal form (and at the “right” level) pretermit. 
What benefits to innovation could loosened proprietary rights bring? 
One answer lies in the fact that a great deal of software is built literally on 
predecessors’ code. In a well-functioning marketplace of vendors, one can 
envision individuals and firms who believe they are in a position to improve 
upon others’ work to contract amongst themselves and split the exclusive 
bounty of the improvement. However, this assumption ignores the fact that 
such firms are often not readily in negotiating contact with one another, and 
the absence of available source code may make it hard for outside innova-2004]  Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software 13 
tors even to explore the possibility of offering advantageous improvements 
to existing developers’ work.
25  
Putting the still-gelling and much debated issue of software patents 
aside,
26 if the proprietary model were not legally enforceable, no contact 
(much less, contract) with the original author would be necessary for an in-
novator to create a derivative work. This production of derivative works 
would include the adaptation of formerly proprietary software into public 
domain software written by downstream authors who do not share the fi-
nancial incentives or interests that the classic contracting model presumes. 
With access to source code and an absence of tight legal restriction on its 
use, nonproprietary authors could help adapt software for audiences whose 
lack of size or money is insufficient to appeal to vendors driven solely by 
anticipated profit. Copyright terms of limited duration are one mechanism 
for splitting the difference between proprietary incentives and later public 
improvements to formerly proprietary works. However, the effectively infi-
nite copyright term of seventy to ninety-five years for computer software 
eliminates one source of cheap inputs for both proprietary and nonpropri-
etary authors who wish to make use of others’ work that may have already 
paid for itself (and for which the proprietary model has provided sufficient 
incentive) several times over.
27 
An author who chooses to place her work in the public domain creates 
more prospects for innovation than one who requires the incentives of pro-
prietization and who, to the extent allowed, then monopolizes improve-
ments to her work. Such a contribution is “found money” that can be shared 
nonrivalrously among consumers, and used without further cost or negotia-
tion by other software vendors.
28 But under even the most restrictive plausi-
ble copyright regime, so long as the rights conveyed can be repudiated, au-
thors are still free to donate their labors to the overall pool of collaborative 
labor around free software, and some profit-driven firms have found rea-
sons to want to do so. For example, Netscape made available, with minimal 
licensing restrictions, the source code of its Communicator 5.0 Web 
browser software through mozilla.org, a form of at-or-below-cost pricing 
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perhaps designed to staunch the flow of users from Netscape Communica-
tor to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.
29 
Beyond making available the option of placing material into the public 
domain, do enforceable copyleft rights contribute to innovation? The ques-
tion is, in its essence, a restatement of the initial puzzle: what is the scope 
of proprietary rights that ought to be created and enforced by the govern-
ment in the service of innovation? If one believes that innovation primarily 
happens with financial incentive and favors ensuring such incentive by 
granting exclusive rights to authors, then an original piece of copylefted 
software is itself an anomaly, and a requirement that derivative software not 
be proprietary removes incentives to build further upon it.
30 If one addition-
ally believes that free software developers would still write new software 
even if the copyleft license were not available—forcing a choice between 
releasing the software into the public domain and claiming traditional pro-
prietary rights—then it would be better not to permit copylefting. A similar 
question might arise over how much control the legal system should permit 
donors to assert over the disposition of their gifts, whether given to charities 
or friends. If donors would still give away money in the absence of an abil-
ity to direct its use, one might assume more efficient allocation of the 
money down the line if the beneficiaries could direct and redirect the funds 
according to circumstances and preference, weighed against the unhappi-
ness of the donor in not being able to more fully specify the uses for her 
money.  
However, the enforceability of copyleft could assist in “commons 
creation” in networked software.
31 Copyleft as a mass license attempts to 
contribute its covered works to a pool of commonly accessible work, and as 
a quid pro quo for using and improving upon those works, to compel others 
to contribute to that pool any improvements they make and wish to release. 
The value of common standards in networked technological endeavors has 
long been appreciated, and if those standards stood to be proprietized by 
some future party, current contributors might be tempted to hold back their 
contributions to the common project.
32  
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The best examples we have of such anxieties in the Internet space, 
however, have more to do with sudden retroactive claims of proprietary 
rights by formerly cooperating firms.
33 For example, the World Wide Web 
Consortium has gone to great lengths to ask its member firms to promise 
not to assert proprietary claims in the standards they contribute to the body. 
And the networking world has reacted with dismay over the prospect that 
the International Standards Organization—which previously had asserted 
copyright in such things as standardized two-letter country code abbrevia-
tions solely for the purpose of selling individual documents containing 
those abbreviations—might now attempt to charge royalties to those firms 
that have made use of the codes in their software.
34 
Indeed, fundamental Internet protocols are written up in ways de-
signed to ensure continued openness. For example, TCP/IP (by which Inter-
net packets are routed) and SMTP (by which email is sent from one Internet 
server to another) are described in “request for comments” documents 
(RFCs) developed in the collaborative model of free software and placed 
under copyright by the Internet Society on behalf of the unincorporated 
Internet Engineering Task Force in a way that is designed to prevent anyone 
from asserting exclusive rights to them. Interestingly, the Internet Society 
license is consummately ambiguous as to its copyleft status—whether pro-
tocols that draw upon those of the Internet Society may themselves be pro-
prietized.
35 At the very least, the Internet Society’s assertion of copyright is 
intended to assure users of the documents that no retroactive claims of more 
restrictive copyright will be made. It says, in relevant part: 
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (<date>). All Rights Reserved. 
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to 
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it 
or assist in its implmentation [sic] may be prepared, copied, published 
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, 
provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are in-
cluded on all such copies and derivative works.
36 
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One cannot tell whether the above license requires that any documents 
drawing on RFCs enough to be called derivative works—perhaps im-
provements upon the standards described within—must be released, if at 
all, in a way that cannot be proprietized. Presumably, though, a company 
making improvements could simply attempt to rewrite the description at a 
high enough level of abstraction so as not to constitute a derivative work, 
and therefore “own” the resulting protocols—derivative to the ideas within 
the RFC documents, but not derivative to the text of the documents them-
selves. Even if this is the case, SMTP and TCP/IP may remain safely non-
proprietized, unless and until the benefit of adopting a proprietary variant 
seems unambiguous enough that a critical mass of Internet users, as repre-
sented by those writing software that in turn uses the RFC protocols, 
chooses to adopt it. 
On the purely instrumentalist grounds of wanting to foster innovation, 
there are reasons to expect that different software authors are motivated by 
different aims. Thus, fostering a system that permits not only public domain 
works, but also proprietary works and copylefted ones, ensures the maxi-
mum range of incentives for those who would write code and share it with 
others. If a particular innovation cries out for improvement, but the entity 
best in a position to improve it is confronted with an undesirable initial 
model—either a proprietary firm wishing to improve upon copylefted soft-
ware, or a set of free software programmers wanting to improve upon pro-
prietary software—the safety valve of inventing around the restrictions im-
posed by the model exists. Examples of both can be found. Microsoft re-
wrote its implementation of Sun’s Java programming language from the 
ground up, leaving Sun Microsystems with only a trademark right, rather 
than a copyright, in the final product. Symmetrically, Richard Stallman 
conceived of GNU/Linux as the near-functional-equivalent, but genetically 
distinct, variant of Unix designed to be free of the original software’s copy-
right claims.
37 
2.  Reliability. 
It’s important to have software that works well. One might think that 
goal is well accounted for in a simple market model, and perhaps reliability 
is but a subset of innovation. But there are reasons to want to emphasize it 
in particular. 
The proprietary model boasts such a notion of reliability: presumably 
consumers will pay exactly for the level of reliability that they want and 
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that can be cost-effectively delivered to them. Companies like Microsoft 
have scores of in-house testers, and indeed, in recent months Microsoft has 
claimed improved reliability
38—rather than new features—as critical to the 
success of further iterations of its software. 
Eric Raymond’s Cathedral and the Bazaar essay argues that “peer-
reviewed” software—such as collaboratively developed free software in 
which the source code is viewable, testable, and changeable by all—is more 
reliable, on the general theory that many disparate eyes can catch more mis-
takes under more circumstances.
39 Of course, making one’s source code 
available does not guarantee that thousands will flock to view it and fix it. 
The patching of such software depends on the charitable instincts of volun-
teer testers, as well as the selfish desires of users of free software to have it 
function well for their own purposes. 
Of course, the development models can overlap somewhat. Proprietary 
software typically goes through a “beta test,” in which consumers are given 
special pricing (but still no access to source code) in exchange for trying 
out new software and reporting bugs that are found. Conversely, the most 
popular free software has variants shepherded by corporate software ven-
dors like Red Hat.
40 These vendors are willing to take responsibility for se-
lecting and distributing improvements to users, and provide general support 
and consultation to those users on a cash-and-carry basis. 
An attempt to generalize about the innate superiority of the free devel-
opment model over the proprietary one along the axis of reliability is diffi-
cult, and the debate in large part turns on which empirical examples are 
chosen to support each side. Still, free and proprietary software can com-
pete alongside one another in a market; market participants wanting to run a 
Web server can decide between installing the free Apache software at one 
price or installing Microsoft software at another price, and can factor into 
the purchasing decision estimates of reliability or ease of addressing later 
problems. 
But there is a more important way in which reliability is at issue, one 
in which individual market decisions may prove insufficient. Twenty-first 
century software is in many cases not installed and used in isolation. 
Rather, the machines running the software are connected to and communi-
cating across the global Internet. To the extent those machines run identical 
software, a single flaw in that software can be exploited across the network, 
and the total cost of software unreliability must be taken into account. That 
total may not be measured only by the sum of harms to each compromised 
user. For example, if one is shopping online among three vendors of books 
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and all three vendors’ sites disappear at the same moment because each is 
running the same flawed software, succumbing to the same maliciously ex-
ploited flaw, the inconvenience is far worse than if each vendor were to ex-
perience the same problems but at different times, for different reasons, be-
cause each was running different software. 
Further, a computer worm may instruct each infected host to generate 
new network traffic, perhaps seeking new computers to infect. That traffic 
slows down the network for everyone—accruing costs even to those not in-
fected or who, because they are running completely different software, can-
not be infected. Homogeneity in deployed software scores well for interop-
erability among machines, but it places everyone’s eggs in one basket. A di-
versity of computer platforms running a diversity of software distributes 
those eggs—perhaps resulting in the same number of potential infections 
but avoiding catastrophic simultaneous infection. 
The notion that free software could come to exist even when the mar-
ket does not otherwise call for it in strict dollar calculus—as in Richard 
Stallman’s GNU/Linux ideological endeavor to recreate Unix functionality 
without using any Unix code—is a windfall insurance policy beyond what-
ever competitive benefits can come when multiple market-driven vendors 
respond to financial incentives to write competing code. 
3.  Use and dissemination. 
Were there not a perceived need to create monetary incentives for its 
production through monopoly control of code, the nonrivalrous nature of 
software would make for an abundance of existing code that could easily 
satisfy every demand if copying were freely permitted. The legal rights of 
the proprietary model of production are geared to create those incentives, 
but they come with a well-documented cost. Tempered only to some extent 
by crude price discrimination, the monopoly holders of rights in proprietary 
software will end up making available fewer copies of their software than 
there are users who want them—users who would pay a price for them that 
still beats the vendor’s marginal cost. This has been used as one basis of 
claiming that leaky enforcement of copyright can actually assist the proprie-
tary vendor while enhancing social welfare, since poorer consumers can 
come together to pool their money to purchase and then—perhaps illegally 
but still beneficially—share a single copy of a proprietary work.
41 
If someone truly cannot afford the software, a vendor might be indif-
ferent to that person’s obtaining and using it, since it cannot be realistically 
counted as a lost sale. Indeed, there may be reasons why it is helpful to get 
someone who might be a future customer to use one’s software at a time 
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when he or she otherwise would not pay for it. This could be for the pur-
poses of acclimatization in anticipation of future paying use, such as in the 
cases of free access to services offered to law students by both Westlaw and 
Lexis. It could also be used, when network effects are thought to be present, 
as a way of creating systemic momentum towards one’s increased market 
share of products by non-paying and paying customers alike. The increas-
ing willingness on Microsoft’s part to cut its prices in developing countries 
may be an example of this, as a way of forestalling competing software—
especially GNU/Linux—from taking root there. And, thanks to network ef-
fects between platform and application, there can be reasons to want to see 
wide adoption of certain components of one’s stable of software. Micro-
soft’s and Netscape’s Internet browsers remain examples of a giveaway in 
service of such a rationale.
42 In Microsoft’s case it was likely to defeat a 
threat to its operating system by the Java computing platform bundled with 
the competing Netscape browser; in Netscape’s case it was largely to make 
sales of Netscape Web servers seem more attractive, given the number of 
Netscape browsers that might be thought to more seamlessly connect to 
them. 
But if equal access is sought, the free and public domain models by 
definition guarantee such opportunity. If one were more concerned about an 
even distribution of technology’s fruits—rather than in providing monetary 
incentives for the creation of those fruits to begin with—then any scheme 
that eschews assertion of exclusive rights over its products would seem 
preferable along this dimension. Copylefting one’s software may provide 
better access than simply releasing it into the public domain, since it insists 
that any works based upon the copylefted software themselves be made 
available without exclusive restriction. 
C.  Accounting for Differential Systemic Legal Vulnerabilities 
Should systemic differences in levels of “legal aggressiveness” be-
tween the competing models be adjusted for? Major vendors of proprietary 
software have a stake, with their counterparts in other proprietary creative 
fields, in defending the overall system of rights that produces the greatest 
revenue. They hire lobbyists, donate to congressional campaigns, and ask 
federal trade representatives to vindicate their structural rights overseas. 
When the World Intellectual Property Organization announced the prospect 
of a meeting devoted to studying the place of nonproprietary production 
models within the spectrum of intellectual property,
43 the Business Software 
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Alliance objected strenuously, and the meeting was canceled.
44 Of course, 
free software advocates are known to function in political circles—there are 
trade associations favorable to the free software idea
45 and numerous aca-
demics making the case for models of nonproprietary production.
46 
Apart from a more general political debate between the competing 
spheres in which proprietary software’s profits may have an advantage over 
free software’s prophets, there is a discernable “litigation differential.” Prior 
to litigation derivative to the SCO v IBM case, there were only two recorded 
instances of litigation initiated by holders of copyleft licenses claiming pro-
prietization of code in violation of the license.
47 This dearth of litigation 
may be traced to the lack of violations, but it might also be plausibly attrib-
uted to the fact that proprietary software does not make available its source 
code—making it difficult to detect if such software contains an infringe-
ment of copylefted code. Free software, on the other hand, is much more 
vulnerable to claims of infringement by proprietary code authors, since the 
source code to free software is, by definition, available for examination by 
would-be plaintiffs. That availability also makes the costs of stealing 
copylefted software typically lower than the costs of stealing proprietary 
code, since free software’s source code is there for the taking. 
Further, the collaborative nature of free software development makes it 
harder to determine where various contributions are coming from, and 
whether they belong to those who purport to donate them. Indeed, in the 
example of an employee of a software company charitably moonlighting for 
a free software project, the employee’s work may not even be the em-
ployee’s to give. A barely-read but still facially enforceable employment 
agreement may commit all software written by the employee to the em-
ployer’s possession, which would set the stage for an infringement claim 
against those within the free software project making use of the employee’s 
contributions.  Of course, the collaborative nature of free software devel-
opment may simply mean that more violations can take place, in which case 
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increased legal vulnerability to claims of infringement would be a natural 
consequence rather than an indication of an unlevel playing field. 
Finally, the costs of litigation are beyond the reach of many free soft-
ware developers—who may be donating their time, but do not expect to 
have to spend or receive hard cash as a result of their labors. The idea of 
providing legal shelters for noncommercial or nonprofit entities—in the 
form of tax-exempt status, charitable immunity from tort, or as a factor in a 
fair use test excusing copyright infringement
48—is not new, and may reflect 
some desire for such enterprises to be able to devote their energies to their 
eleemosynary purposes. Of course, such breaks are often controversial,
49 
but a systemic vulnerability of free software to theft by proprietary compa-
nies, coupled with a comparatively higher exposure of free software au-
thors, publishers, and even mere users to accusations of theft by proprietary 
software companies, suggests a playing field that is not level. 
CONCLUSION 
SCO v IBM will be the first case to test the legal viability of the free 
software development model, and its concomitant practice of making soft-
ware source code routinely available to the general public. It most likely 
will not be the last. In future work, I will explore the possibility that, under 
the normative principles described here, copyright law should be construed 
in a way that does not permit a poisoned pea of unauthorized code under the 
mattress of a massive software project to effectively compromise the entire 
work. I will consider the possibility that copyright’s statute of limitations 
might be applied to require those claiming copyright infringement to bring 
such claims within a three-year (or shorter) window stemming from the tar-
geted software’s initial public release of source code, encouraging creators 
within both models to release their source code, and providing helpful legal 
stability to those wishing to work within a collaborative software develop-
ment environment. 
Both free and proprietary software production have a storied and ven-
erable history dating back to the first moments of public computing. Ensur-
ing a demilitarized zone between them serves most of the interests we 
would care to advance. It shows caution in the face of uncertainty about the 
long-term benefits of either model against the other and demonstrates an 
appreciation of the subtlety of the conflict between them. 
                                                                                                                           
48  See 17 USC § 107(1) (2000) (providing that “the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes” should be one of 
the factors considered in determining whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is a “fair use”). 
49  See, for example, Tanya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax Treatment of Private 
Foundations and Public Charities, 22 Va Tax Rev 137, 148–50 (2002) (discussing the history of contro-
versy surrounding tax treatment of private foundations and Congress’s attempts to thwart abusive tax 
shelters). 